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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Why do rich people seeking reductions in their tax burdens, who 
have the ability to influence Congress directly through lobbying and 
campaign contributions, sometimes resort to grassroots populist methods? 
And why do non-rich people sometimes join the rich in their anti-tax 
movements? These are the puzzles Isaac William Martin sets out to solve in 
Rich People’s Movements.1 Martin’s historical research—much of it based 
on original sources to which scholars have previously paid little or no 
attention—reveals that, far from being a recent innovation, populist-style 
movements against progressive federal taxation go back nearly a century, to 
the 1920s. Although Martin identifies various anti-tax movements 
throughout the past century, he strikingly concludes that there has been 
“substantial continuity from one campaign to the next, so that, in some 
                                                 
* Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
1. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS 
CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX THE ONE PERCENT (2013) [hereinafter MARTIN, RICH 
PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS]. 
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respects, [Rich People’s Movements constitutes] only a single case study of 
one more-or-less unbroken movement tradition.”2 
 Based on the historical evidence, Martin suggests solutions to his 
two puzzles. His explanation of the first puzzle is that rich people have 
turned to grassroots methods when “their usual tactics [have broken] down,” 
and “only when they knew how, and they knew how only when they had 
been taught.”3 The earliest anti-tax activists learned grassroots tactics from 
the several non-tax American social movements—suffragist, temperance, 
and populist—of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; and once 
those tactics had been learned by the anti-tax pioneers, they were passed on 
to the anti-tax movements of later decades.
4
 Ironically, one of the grassroots 
social movements, the tactics of which were adopted by anti-tax activists, 
was the progressive movement which led to the adoption of the Sixteenth 
Amendment and the enactment of the federal individual income tax (both in 
1913).
5
 Anti-tax campaigns waxed and waned over the decades in response 
to the presence or absence of tax policy threats to the rich. The crucial 
mobilizing threats involved not the mere existence of heavy tax burdens, but 
“rapid tax increases on the rich” or the prospect of such increases.6 
Martin’s solution to the first of his puzzles is richly supported by his 
painstaking historical research. His suggested solution to the second 
puzzle—the existence of substantial non-rich support for rich people’s anti-
tax movements—is less convincing. According to Martin, “the non-rich 
sympathizers . . . always had particular reasons to see top tax rates as 
threatening [to themselves]. . . .  Many [non-rich] people . . . campaigned for 
tax cuts in the top brackets because they believed they were also protecting 
their own economic security.”7 This, I think, is largely wrong. For the most 
part, the non-rich supporters of rich people’s movements were not motivated 
by a concern that the high tax rates applicable to the rich might soon also 
apply to them. Rather, they had two different reasons: (1) a principled belief 
that heavy taxes on anyone were simply wrong, even if the burdensome taxes 
on others were no threat to one’s self-interest, and (2) a motivation based on 
the post-World War II packaging of rich people’s anti-tax proposals as 
involving something for everyone, so that the non-rich could self-interestedly 
support large tax cuts for the rich as part of a package also promising (much 
smaller) tax cuts for themselves.
8
 
                                                 
2. Id. at xiii.   
3. Id. at 13–14. 
4. Id. at 197.   
5. Id. at 41–42. 
6. Id. at 198. 
7. Id. at 199. 
8. For a brilliant exploration of this phenomenon, in the context of the so-
called Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, see LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL 
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The next section of this review summarizes Martin’s original and 
compelling work in uncovering the history of a century of rich people’s anti-
tax movements. That is followed by sections on three shortcomings of the 
book—an inadequate explanation of why non-rich persons have joined in the 
movements, Martin’s odd decision to exclude from the book’s coverage two 
of the most important anti-tax movements of recent decades (the flat tax and 
the FairTax), and the scant attention paid by the book to the often-fascinating 
rhetoric of the anti-tax movements. Although I consider these criticisms to be 
considerably more than quibbles, they do not alter my view that Rich 
People’s Movements is a major contribution to the scholarly literature on the 
history of taxation in twentieth-century America. It shines a light on a series 
of related movements—many of which had been nearly forgotten even by tax 
history scholars—which are fascinating in their own right and which have 
continued significance today as the predecessors of the Tea Party and other 
grassroots anti-tax movements of the twenty-first century. 
 
II. A CENTURY OF RICH PEOPLE’S ANTI-TAX MOVEMENTS 
 
The first grassroots anti-tax movement described by Martin involved 
the formation during the 1920s, under the direction of anti-tax movement 
entrepreneur J. A. Arnold, of numerous “tax clubs” around the country (with 
notable concentrations in Texas and Iowa).
9
 The goal of the clubs was a 
sharp reduction in the federal income tax rates applicable to the richest 
taxpayers. The clubs were dominated by rural bankers, whose own incomes 
put them nowhere near the top income tax brackets. Their objective was not 
the reduction of their own tax liabilities, but rather an improvement in their 
banks’ competitive position vis-a-vis federal land banks. Mortgage-backed 
securities issued by the land banks paid tax-exempt interest,
10
 whereas 
interest on similar securities issued by the rural banks was fully taxable. 
Having failed in a campaign to eliminate the land banks’ ability to pay tax 
exempt interest,
11
 the rural bankers changed tactics and called for a dramatic 
reduction in the top income tax rates. This would reduce the economic 
significance of the tax-exempt status of the interest paid by the land banks, 
which in turn would reduce the land banks’ competitive advantage.12 Partly 
as a result of the efforts of the tax clubs, the Revenue Act of 1926 cut the top 
individual income tax rate from 46 percent to 25 percent.
13
 
                                                                                                                   
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 162–96 (Chapter 
6, “Homer Gets a Tax Cut”) (2008). 
9. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 44–67. 
10. Id. at 53. 
11. Id. at 54. 
12. Id. at 55. 
13. Id. at 64. 
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Martin has rescued this fascinating episode from obscurity by some 
truly impressive archival research in (among other sources) the records of the 
clubs. The story of the tax clubs demonstrates that, half a century before the 
pioneering work of Stanley Surrey on tax expenditures,
14
 Arnold and the 
rural bankers had a solid practical understanding of the economic effects of 
tax expenditures, including how the significance of an exclusion-type (or 
deduction-type) tax expenditure depends on the tax rate avoided by reason of 
the tax expenditure. 
One might quibble that it is not so clear that the story of Arnold and 
the tax clubs belongs in a book on rich people’s anti-tax movements. The 
rural bankers themselves were no more than upper-middle class (a point 
Martin emphasizes).
15
 This was not a case where rich people started a 
movement to reduce their own taxes, and then persuaded some non-rich 
sympathizers to join their cause. Rather, from start to finish this was an 
upper-middle class movement to reduce taxes on the rich, motivated by the 
belief of the movement members that reduced taxes on the rich would 
indirectly benefit themselves. 
Even if it was not, strictly speaking, a rich people’s movement, the 
tax club movement of the 1920s laid the foundations for later rich people’s 
anti-tax movements, by demonstrating that a grassroots movement to lower 
income tax rates on the rich could be effective, and by serving as a starting 
point for J. A. Arnold’s long career in rich people’s movements. Arnold also 
played a leading role in the grassroots effort of the late 1930s to persuade the 
legislatures of two-thirds of the states to call for a constitutional convention 
for the purpose of repealing the Sixteenth Amendment.
16
 It was an odd sort 
of repeal, since the proposed replacement amendment would have reinstated 
the language of the repealed Sixteenth, followed by a new clause limiting the 
top income tax rate to 25 percent.
17
 Apparently the rhetorical power of a call 
for “repeal” was thought to be sufficient to warrant labeling what was in 
substance a modification of the Income Tax Amendment as its repeal. An 
especially noteworthy contribution of Arnold to the campaign for the 25 
percent limitation was the 1938 publication of The Desire to Own, his 151-
page explanation of why “[t]he colossal mistake in the annals of this 
government, and one that reverberates through-out the nations of the earth, 
was the passage of the 16th Amendment.”18 
                                                 
14. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF 
TAX EXPENDITURES (1973). 
15. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 58. 
16. Id. at 68–89. 
17. Id. at 74. 
18. J. A. ARNOLD, THE DESIRE TO OWN 7 (1938) [hereinafter ARNOLD, THE 
DESIRE TO OWN]. The Desire to Own is discussed in more detail infra, text 
accompanying notes 96–110. 
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Although the 25 percent campaign did not achieve its goal, it was 
impressively long-lived and enjoyed considerable success in the state 
legislatures.
19
 By the end of 1951, the campaign needed only six more states 
to reach the two-thirds required for a constitutional convention.
20
 After that, 
however, the movement fell into decline, partly out of concern that a 
convention might open a “Pandora’s box” of constitutional amendments,21 
and partly because the limitation movement was eclipsed by a more radical 
movement for the elimination of the federal income tax.
22
 
The more radical anti-tax movement was led mostly by women—in 
particular, “factory owner and fashion icon”23 Vivian Kellems and retired 
movie star (and wife of the owner of the Washington Redskins) Corinne 
Griffith. Martin provides a vivid account of Kellems, Griffith, and the 
women-led anti-tax movement of the 1950s.
24
 A highlight is his description 
of the first meeting (in 1951) of Kellems’ “Liberty Belles,” a women’s 
organization dedicated to the abolition of the federal income tax.
25
 (Men 
were welcome only in the “Liberty Boys” auxiliary26). 
Martin errs, however, in his explanation of why women rose to 
prominence in the rich people’s anti-tax movement of the 1950s. His claim is 
that women were reacting to the introduction by 1948 legislation of joint 
income tax filing for married couples.
27
 Relying largely on the work of 
Edward J. McCaffery,
28
 Martin contends that joint filing was intended by 
Congress to discourage married women from working outside the home, and 
that women of the early 1950s understood and resented that congressional 
intent.   
It is true that joint returns can discourage wives from working. 
Suppose a husband is firmly committed to the labor force and his wife is 
deciding between full-time homemaking and paid employment. Viewing her 
husband’s earnings as having fully occupied the lower income tax rate 
brackets of their joint return, and viewing her own earnings (if any) as 
                                                 
19. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT, supra note 1, at 90–108. 
20. Id. at 105. 
21. Id. 
22. For an excellent highly-detailed account of the campaign for the 25 
percent constitutional limitation, see Marc Linder, Eisenhower-Era Marxist-
Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction for the Rich, 70 
TULANE L. REV. 905, 943–68 (1996).  Linder’s work is not mentioned in Rich 
People’s Movements. There is no indication that Martin was aware of Linder’s 
important article.   
23. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 110. 
24. Id. at 110–129. 
25. Id. at 116–17. 
26. Id. at 117. 
27. Id. at 118. 
28. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 56–57 (1997). 
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stacked on top of his for income tax purposes, she may decide against paid 
employment because of the relatively high marginal tax rates that would 
apply to even her first dollars of earnings. The problem, as I have explained 
in more detail elsewhere, in a review of the McCaffery book on which 
Martin relies,
29
 is the ahistorical nature of this analysis as applied to the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Two-earner couples had not yet become a major 
social phenomenon. There is no evidence that Congress was even aware of 
the joint return stacking effect in 1948, let alone that Congress was enlisting 
the effect in an effort to keep married women out of the labor force. To the 
best of my knowledge, there is also no evidence that anyone in the women’s 
anti-tax movement of the 1950s complained about, or was even aware of, the 
stacking effect. Certainly Martin offers no such evidence. The first 
identification of and objection to the stacking effect did not appear until 
1972, in a path breaking law review article by Grace Ganz Blumberg.
30
 
Moreover, the effect of the 1948 joint return legislation was almost 
always to decrease—and never to increase—the income tax liability of a 
married couple, compared to their combined pre-1948 tax liabilities under 
separate filing (this was the well-known “marriage bonus” of joint returns). 
This was true even in the case of the few two-earner married couples of the 
period. Even if wives had been aware of and opposed to the stacking effect 
(and, again, there is no evidence that they were), joint filing would cause 
them to protest only if they resented the stacking effect more than they 
appreciated the increase in their after-tax marital income.    
The emergence of female leadership for the anti-tax movement of 
the early 1950s was a remarkable development, and requires an explanation. 
But whatever the explanation may be—perhaps some combination of the 
historical accident of the force of personality of Griffith and (especially) 
Kellems; the expertise in grassroots tactics gained by Kellems and other 
women from their involvement in earlier women’s movements;31 and an 
unprecedentedly large number of intelligent, well-educated, and affluent 
married women with time to devote to activism—Martin provides no reason 
to believe that the introduction of joint returns is even a small part of the 
explanation. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the women-led movement of the 
early 1950s was followed by the campaign for the Liberty Amendment, 
under the leadership of Willis (Bill) Stone.
32
 Stone’s original goal was a 
                                                 
29. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1021, 1034–39 (1997). 
30. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of 
Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 52–54 
(1972). 
31. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 110. 
32. Id. at 141–54. 
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constitutional amendment prohibiting the federal government from engaging 
in “any business, commercial, or industrial enterprise in competition with its 
citizens.”33 He eventually realized, however, that he could increase the 
support for his proposal by combining it with a constitutional prohibition of 
income taxation. The purported connection between the two prongs of the 
proposed amendment was the fanciful claim that the proceeds from the sales 
of government-owned businesses would be more than enough to replace the 
revenue lost from the repeal of the income tax.
34
 Despite this creative 
packaging and a few successes in persuading state legislatures to call for a 
constitutional convention focused on the Liberty Amendment,
35
 the 
movement never came close to achieving its ultimate goal. Nor did the 
movement spur Congress to enact tax cuts to stave off the adoption of the 
Amendment.
36
 
As Martin’s survey of rich people’s movements reaches the more 
recent past, the book becomes less groundbreaking, simply because the more 
recent movements are—unlike the earlier movements rescued by Martin 
from the dustbin of history—already fairly well know. Martin furnishes 
engaging accounts of how the movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
for a balanced-budget-and-tax-limitation constitutional amendment gained 
momentum from the state-level property tax revolts of the 1970s,
37
 and how 
the extremely temporary (one-year) repeal of the estate tax was caused–
somewhat remotely—by a proposal for national long-term care insurance.38 
A number of these relatively recent developments have been described in 
more detail elsewhere,
39
 but Martin provides a valuable new perspective by 
placing the anti-tax movements of recent decades in the context of a century 
of rich people’s movements.   
There is, however, one significant problem with the book’s 
description of rich people’s movements of the past few decades—the 
omission of any discussion of the movements to replace the income tax with 
either the flat tax or the FairTax. Those neglected movements are discussed 
below, in Part III of this review. 
 
                                                 
33. Id. at 142. 
34. Id. at 144. 
35. Id. at 145–49. 
36. Id. at 149. 
37. Id. at 155–60. 
38. Id. at 182–94. 
39. For example, Martin himself has provided a detailed account of the 
property tax revolts of the 1970s. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX 
REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS (2008).  
Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro have done the same for estate tax repeal.  MICHAEL 
J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING 
INHERITED WEALTH (2005). 
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III. EXPLAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE NON-RICH 
 
One of the major puzzles Martin sets out to solve is the substantial 
support provided to rich people’s movements by the non-rich. In his 
conclusion he offers an explanation based on self-interest: 
 
The non-rich sympathizers . . . always had particular reasons 
to see top tax rates as threatening—from the farm mortgage 
bankers of 1924 who feared that high tax rates advantaged 
their competitors, to the married women of 1952 who saw 
that they were subject to higher marginal tax rates than their 
husbands, to the upper-middle-income taxpayers of 1978 
who saw that inflation could push them into higher income 
tax brackets.
40
 
 
There is an important insight here: under certain circumstances, non-rich can 
have strong self-interested reasons for favoring tax cuts for the richest 
Americans—strong enough to support a rich people’s movement, or even to 
start one. The rural bankers’ movement of the 1920s is a striking example of 
this phenomenon. 
The other two examples offered by Martin, however, do not support 
his claim. As explained earlier,
41
 there is no evidence to support Martin’s 
claim that married women were aware of—let alone up-in-arms over—the 
stacking effect in 1952. But even supposing they were aware of and outraged 
by the effect, they would not feel threatened by the top marginal rates of the 
income tax unless the stacking effect put them in range of those top rates. 
The top marginal rate in 1952 was 92 percent.
42
 I am not aware of any 
statistics on the percentage of tax returns subject to that rate in 1952, but 
recent work by the Tax Policy Center has provided data on the percentage of 
returns with income in the top bracket for the tax years 1958 through 2009 
(with the exception of 1978).
43
 In 1958, 0.3 percent of all returns—fewer 
than one in three hundred—were subject to a top marginal rate higher than 
                                                 
40. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 199. 
41. Supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
42. TAX POLICY CENTER, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX: PERSONAL 
EXEMPTIONS AND LOWEST AND HIGHEST TAX BRACKET TAX RATES AND TAX BASE 
FOR REGULAR TAX, TAX YEARS 1913-2013 (2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter. 
org/taxfacts/content/pdf/historical_parameters.pdf [hereinafter TAX POLICY CENTER, 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX]. 
43. TAX POLICY CENTER, PERCENTAGE OF RETURNS BY THE HIGHEST 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY MARGINAL TAX RATE, 1958-2009 (2012), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/historical_returns_by_smtr.pd
f [hereinafter TAX POLICY CENTER, PERCENTAGE OF RETURNS]. 
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50 percent.
44
 The income tax rate structure in 1958 was very similar to the 
1952 rate structure (the top rate in 1958 was 91 percent),
45
 and economic 
conditions in the two years were not radically different (although there was a 
mild recession in early 1958), so the share of returns subject to rates above 
50 percent in 1952 must also have been very low. Thus, even if married 
women in 1952 understood and objected to the stacking effect, the only 
married women who would have had self-interested reasons “to see top tax 
rates as threatening” (with top tax rates defined expansively—in the context 
of a top rate of 92 percent—as rates above 50 percent) would have been 
those in households well within the top one percent of the income 
distribution—in other words, the rich. 
The same basic analysis applies to Martin’s claim about 1978. 
Although top-bracket percentage data are not available for 1978, we do have 
that information for both 1977 and 1979, and the same 70 percent top rate 
prevailed in all three years.
46
 Marginal rates above 50 percent applied to 0.8 
percent of all returns in 1977 and to 1.0 percent of all returns in 1979.
47
 For 
the approximately 99 percent of the population not subject to rates above 50 
percent, there was no reason to feel threatened by the top and near-top rates. 
Inflationary bracket creep might push a taxpayer in, say, the 48 percent 
bracket, into the 50 percent or 53 percent bracket, but not into the 70 percent 
top bracket, or even into the brackets near or above 60 percent. Again, the 
only taxpayers with reason to feel threatened by the top rates were a small 
fraction of the top one percent of the income distribution—that is, the rich. 
There are, I think, two better explanations for the non-rich support of 
rich people’s movements—one of which goes completely unnoticed by 
Martin, and the other of which he mentions only in passing. The first is the 
tremendous popular appeal of the attitude identified by Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel, and labeled by them as “everyday libertarianism.”48 
According to Murphy and Nagel, everyday libertarianism is “an unexamined 
and generally nonexplicit assumption”49 that people earn their pretax 
incomes without any assistance from the government, with the result that 
there is a strong presumption that it is unfair for the government to tax away 
any of that pretax income. Although I am persuaded by the Murphy-Nagel 
book-length critique of everyday libertarianism,
50
 I suspect that everyday 
                                                 
44. Id. 
45. TAX POLICY CENTER, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, supra note 42. 
46. Id. 
47. TAX POLICY CENTER, PERCENTAGE OF RETURNS, supra note 43. 
48. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 31–37 
(2002). 
49. Id. at 36. 
50. Lawrence Zelenak, The Myth of Pretax Income, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2261 (2003) (reviewing LIAM MURPHY, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE (2002)). 
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libertarianism seems self-evidently correct to much—probably most—of the 
population, and has seemed so throughout the existence of the federal 
income tax. If so, this would provide not a self-interested, but a principled 
(even if mistaken) reason for the non-rich to support rich people’s 
movements. 
Some of the leaders of rich people’s movements appealed for 
support from the non-rich on the basis of precisely this principled argument. 
The spirit of everyday libertarianism permeates Frank Chodorov’s 1954 
book, The Income Tax: Root of All Evil.
51
 Chodorov laments: 
 
The government says to the citizen: “Your earnings are not 
exclusively your own; we have a claim on them, and our 
claim precedes yours; we will allow you to keep some of it, 
because we recognize your need, not your right; but 
whatever we grant you is for us to decide.”52 
 
And again: 
 
The Internal Revenue Bureau is charged with the task of 
enforcing an immoral law, a law that violates the principle 
of private property. . . . Even the doctrinaire socialist, while 
decrying the iniquity of private property, resents being 
deprived of his own; after all, the socialist is human. It is 
written into our consciousness that“mine is mine,” and all 
the tomes in support of income taxation cannot wipe out 
that thought.
53
 
 
Although Chodorov is more insistent and articulate on this point than 
most other movement leaders, similar arguments appear throughout the many 
decades of rich people’s movements. Martin does not quote either of the 
above passages, or any other passages from Chodorov to similar effect, nor 
does he pay more than glancing attention to similar arguments from any 
source.
54
 In part, this seems attributable to Martin’s generally low level of 
interest in the intellectual history of rich people’s movements, as contrasted 
with his much greater interest in the sociological history of the movements. 
                                                 
51. FRANK CHODOROV, THE INCOME TAX: ROOT OF ALL EVIL (1954) 
[hereinafter CHODOROV, ROOT OF ALL EVIL]. 
52. Id. at 11. 
53. Id. at 64 (emphasis in original). 
54. Martin does mention that “rights-based rhetoric . . . was easily 
accessible to people without economic expertise,” id. at 129, but he does not make 
the more important point that the everyday libertarian position has great intuitive 
appeal for many people.   
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Martin sees his book as a corrective to the work of other scholars of modern 
American conservatism, who have (in his view) paid too much attention to 
intellectual history, and who thus “neglect everything that made the 
libertarian strand of American conservatism more than just a debating 
society.”55 Apart from the corrective explanation for his focus, Martin simply 
does not take the intellectual underpinnings of the movements as seriously as 
he takes the sociology of the movements. In his view, “the grassroots 
libertarian tradition is not always logically coherent, but it is sociologically 
coherent.”56 
Even if he were more attuned to the movements’ ideas in general, 
Martin might have missed the centrality of everyday libertarianism to the 
movements, because he rejects everyday libertarianism without seeming to 
realize that he is doing so. The book’s introduction is littered with evidence 
of Martin’s baseline assumption about fairness in taxation, which is the exact 
opposite of everyday libertarianism, and which is—in Martin’s case—just as 
unexamined and nonexplicit as the views of the average everyday libertarian. 
Thus he describes rich people’s movements as “demand[ing] that 
government redistribute resources to the rich,”57 without acknowledging or 
seeming to realize that Chodorov and his movement colleagues would have 
described themselves as demanding that government stop redistributing 
resources away from the rich. Similarly, Martin describes the movements as 
“frankly and unabashedly in favor of more income inequality,”58 whereas 
Chodorov and colleagues would describe themselves as opposed to 
redistribution, rather than as in favor of income inequality per se. Martin 
asks why the rich “sometimes protest to demand even more income and 
wealth for themselves.”59 Chodorov would respond that Martin has chosen 
the wrong baseline. The rich may be asking for even more after-tax income 
relative to current law, but relative to pre-tax income they are merely asking 
to be allowed to keep more of what is rightly theirs. My point is not that 
Martin is wrong and Chodorov right on the merits (actually, I agree with 
Martin on the choice-of-baseline question), but that by failing to understand 
Chodorov’s position Martin misses what is probably the single most 
important reason for the support of rich people’s movements by the non-rich. 
The second better explanation for non-rich support of rich people’s 
movements—the one Martin does not miss completely, but mentions only in 
passing—is the conversion of the federal income tax from a class tax to a 
mass tax during World War II. In 1939, only one American in twenty paid 
                                                 
55. Id. at 22. 
56. Id.  
57. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1. 
58. Id. at 5. 
59. Id. at 8. 
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the income or was a dependent of an income taxpayer.
60
 By the war’s end, 
nearly three of every four Americans were covered by the income tax.
61
 
Before the war, the major rich people’s movement of the 1930s had been the 
drive for a constitutional amendment to limit the top marginal income tax 
rate to 25 percent,
62
 a movement misleadingly described by its proponents as 
a movement to “repeal” the Sixteenth Amendment, given that the plan was 
for the immediate re-adoption of the text of the Sixteenth Amendment, along 
with the new 25 percent limitation.
63
  After the war, however, the movements 
of the 1950s had as their goal the elimination of the income tax.
64
 What 
explains the difference? Martin suggests that the post-war drive for 
elimination was attributable to the absolutism of Vivian Kellems, which she 
had learned from the women’s suffrage movement.65 But as Martin himself 
points out,
66
 J. A. Arnold had made an absolutist property-rights argument 
against the income tax in his 1938 book, The Desire to Own,
67
 yet there had 
been no movement to eliminate the income tax before the war.   
So why the difference in pre- and post-war movement goals? Martin 
suggests it may have been just a matter of Kellems having had the courage of 
her convictions where Arnold had not: “Unlike J. A. Arnold, Kellems 
followed this line of argument to its logical conclusion.”68 According to 
Martin, “The goal was no longer a millionaire’s amendment. Thanks to 
Vivian Kellems and Corinne Griffith, it was now a proposal to abolish 
income taxes across the board, for rich and middle-income people alike.”69 
But most of the “thanks” rightly goes not to Kellems and Griffith, but to the 
war-caused change in the scope of the income tax, from a class tax to a mass 
tax. Arnold and his colleagues in the pre-war movements could not have 
proposed to abolish income taxes “for rich and middle-income people alike,” 
for the simple reason that before World War II the income tax did not apply 
to middle-income people. As an explanation for the change in goals from 
limitation of the income tax to its elimination, the postwar ability of the 
movement to appeal to the self-interest of the middle-class in abolishing the 
income tax looms much larger than the force of personality of Vivian 
Kellems and Corinne Griffith. The movements became more radical after the 
war not because Kellems and Griffith had more radical anti-tax ideologies 
                                                 
60. LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME 
TAX 62, tbl. 9 (1968). 
61. Id. 
62. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 68–89. 
63. Id. at 74. 
64. Id. at 110–54. 
65. Id. at 126–27. 
66. Id. at 126. 
67. ARNOLD, THE DESIRE TO OWN, supra note 18. 
68. MARTIN RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 126.   
69. Id. at 128. 
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than Arnold (they did not), but because the expansion of the coverage of the 
income tax vastly increased the percentage of the population with self-
interested reasons to favor repeal.
70
 
 
IV. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE FLAT TAX AND THE FAIRTAX? 
 
In recent decades opponents of the federal income tax have 
concentrated their attacks on two features of the tax—its progressive 
marginal rate structure and the fact that it (sometimes
71
) taxes saved income 
as well as consumed income.
72
 Both objections to the income tax qualify as 
rich people’s complaints; it is only affluent taxpayers whose income is 
subject to the higher marginal tax rates, and it is only affluent taxpayers who 
have significant amounts of saved income. 
Although Rich People’s Movements appropriately emphasizes the 
opposition to progressive rates, one could read the book cover-to-cover and 
remain unaware that in recent decades a tax policy battle has raged between 
proponents of taxing income and proponents of taxing only consumption. 
Some of the consumption tax advocates are academics who approach the 
issue from a decidedly non-populist perspective,
73
 and some consumption tax 
proponents are not easily classified as part of any rich people’s movement 
because of their support for progressive consumption taxes.
74
 But two recent 
                                                 
70. Of course, a middle-class taxpayer might not support income tax repeal 
on self-interested grounds if she thought that it would be replaced by some other 
equally burdensome tax, or that the loss of tax revenues would lead to a loss of 
crucial government services. But with enough magical thinking those concerns 
could be made to disappear. Martin quotes Griffith as giving the following answer 
to those who asked how the federal government would replace the revenue lost 
from income tax repeal: “I am sure that those who ask that question are asking it in 
all honesty. But my answer is: we have no substitute for waste, graft, and 
corruption.” MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 138 (emphasis 
in original). 
71. The so-called income tax is actually a hybrid of an income tax and a 
consumption tax. See e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid 
Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992) (explaining the hybrid 
nature of the tax); Lawrence Zelenak, Debt-Financed Consumption and a Hybrid 
Income-Consumption Tax, 64 TAX L. REV. 1 (2010) (same). 
72. For a survey of recent proposals to replace the income tax with a 
different form of taxation that would eliminate progressive rates, taxation of saved 
income, or both, see Lawrence Zelenak, Article, Will the Federal Income Tax Have 
a Bicentennial?, ___ FLA. ST. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2014). 
73. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of 
an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1413 
(2006). 
74. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO MAKE 
THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002). 
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(and ongoing) movements to replace the income tax with a flat-rate 
consumption tax—the campaign for the Hall-Rabushka-Forbes “flat tax”75 
and the campaign for the “FairTax” (a national retail sales tax)76—would 
seem to be the rich people’s tax movements of the past two decades. 
Bizarrely, neither the flat tax nor the FairTax is mentioned in the text 
of Rich People’s Movements. The only mention of the two proposals appears 
in an endnote to the book’s Introduction. The note offers a sort-of 
explanation for the omission of the two proposals from the book’s list of 
post-Sixteenth Amendment rich people’s anti-tax movements: “The list 
excludes twenty-first-century phenomena such as . . . the campaign for the 
so-called FairTax. It also excludes the grassroots ‘Flat Tax’ lobby that 
emerged in connection with the presidential campaign of Steve Forbes in 
1996.”77   
The only explanation offered for the omission of the FairTax 
movement is that it appeared in the wrong century, the twenty-first rather 
than the twentieth. There are three problems with this explanation. First, 
nothing could be more arbitrary than cutting off the story at the turn of the 
century, merely because the century had turned. While the exigencies of 
book publishing may require cutting off a narrative a few months—perhaps 
even an entire year—before the publication date, there is no reason to ignore 
more than a decade of highly relevant recent events because of the 
happenstances of the Gregorian calendar and the base ten number system. 
Second, the explanation fails on its own terms, because the FairTax 
movement in fact began in the twentieth century. According to the 
movement’s website, the movement was organized in 1995, under the name 
Americans for Fair Taxation (AFFT), “as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, nonpartisan 
grassroots organization solely dedicated to replacing the current tax 
system.”78 By 1998, the organization had developed (with the help of, among 
others, Harvard economist Dale Jorgenson) its plan to replace the income tax 
with a 23 percent national sales tax, and to promote the proposal with a 
national grassroots campaign.
79
 Co-founder Leo Linbeck, a Texas 
construction tycoon, told the Wall Street Journal, “If we don’t sign up at 
                                                 
75. For the original version of the flat-tax proposal, see ROBERT E. HALL 
& ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1985) [hereinafter HALL & RABUSHKA, THE 
FLAT TAX]. 
76. For the original version of the FairTax proposal and the arguments in 
its favor, see NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK: SAYING 
GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE IRS (2005) [hereinafter BOORTZ & 
LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK]. 
77. MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 209, n.14. 
78. About Americans for Fair Taxation, www.FAIRTAX.ORG, http//www. 
fairtax.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about (last visited February 11, 2014).    
79. Paul A. Gigot, Have They Got a Sales Tax for You, WALL ST. J., 
January 16, 1998, at A14. 
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least 1,000 people in every congressional district, then we’ve created an 
Edsel and not a Mustang.”80 It is true that the movement grew in prominence 
in the twenty-first century. Aided by the promotion of the FairTax in the 
2005 bestseller by Neal Boortz and John Linder, The FairTax Book,
81
 by 
2007 AFFT claimed to have signed up more than 800,000 supporters.
82
 On 
its website today, AFFT sets for itself the goal of “recruit[ing] 3,000 activists 
in each of the 435 congressional districts,”83 and provides links to more than 
three dozen local FairTax clubs.
84
  
In short, although the FairTax movement has gained momentum 
during the twenty-first century, it was undeniably well underway in the 
twentieth century, before Martin cuts off his story. And this leads to the third 
problem with the book’s rationale for its disregard of the movement–the 
inconsistency between the book’s exclusion of the centuries-crossing 
FairTax movement and the book’s devotion of an entire chapter to the 
equally centuries-crossing movement to repeal the estate tax.
85
 If having 
occurred to a significant extent in the twenty-first century was reason enough 
to exclude the FairTax movement from the book, it should also have been 
reason enough to exclude the movement to repeal the estate tax. 
In the case of the flat tax, the book offers no explanation for its 
omission. Martin concedes the existence of a twentieth-century grassroots 
campaign to replace the income tax with the flat tax; in an endnote he 
references “the grassroots ‘Flat Tax’ lobby that emerged in connection with 
the presidential campaign of Steve Forbes in 1996.”86 In the same endnote, 
however, Martin announces that the book will not concern itself with the flat 
tax. This is mystifying. The flat tax
87
 has an impressive intellectual pedigree 
as the brainchild of the economist Robert E. Hall and the political scientist 
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Alvin Rabushka (both of the Hoover Institution),
88
 and an impressive 
political history as the proposal that briefly catapulted Steve Forbes to front-
runner status in the race for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination.
89
 
More recently, the flat-tax baton has been picked up by the conservative 
grassroots organization FreedomWorks.
90
 In a 2011 press release, 
FreedomWorks touts the flat tax as allowing individuals “to file their tax 
returns in five minutes on a form the size of a postcard,” and announces its 
intention to “engag[e] its 1.4 million limited-government grassroots 
volunteers across the nation to raise awareness on this issue.”91 Like the 
FairTax, the flat tax unquestionably deserves a place of prominence in any 
history of post-Sixteenth Amendment anti-tax rich people’s movements. Rich 
People’s Movements is seriously incomplete by reason of its omission of 
these two campaigns from its historical survey. 
By ignoring the FairTax and the flat tax, the book not only 
disregards two of the more significant anti-tax rich people’s movements in 
the history of the federal income tax; it also misses an opportunity to 
examine a central disagreement within the universe of rich people’s 
movements between those who would prefer to campaign for the simple 
abolition of hated taxes, and those who would prefer to urge the abolition of 
hated taxes and their replacement by less objectionable taxes. This 
disagreement involves questions of both strategy and principle. By 
describing in detail several of the simple abolition campaigns, including the 
1950s movement typified by Corinne Griffith’s claim that the income tax 
could be repealed without replacement because all the revenue it raised was 
spent on “waste, graft, and corruption,”92 and the more recent campaign to 
repeal the estate tax,
93
 while ignoring the two most important repeal-and-
replace movements, Rich People’s Movements creates the misleading 
impression that anti-tax rich people’s movements have always been 
dominated by those who favored repeal without replacement. At least in the 
last few decades, the truth is closer to the opposite. 
 
 
                                                 
88. See HALL & RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX, supra note 75. 
89. Front-Runner Forbes, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 1996, at A18 
(noting that Forbes was the front-runner in the delegate count and describing Forbes 
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V. THE RHETORIC OF RICH PEOPLE’S ANTI-TAX MOVEMENTS: 
PARANOID AND NON-PARANOID STYLES 
 
Martin is a sociologist, and understandably his primary interest is in 
the sociology of the anti-tax movements, rather than in their intellectual 
history and rhetoric. He claims, with some merit, that his focus on the 
sociology of the American anti-tax right wing is justified as a corrective to 
other scholarship, which has focused nearly exclusively on the history of 
ideas rather than on the history of social movements. According to Martin, 
other studies of twentieth-century American economic conservatism “have 
told us very little about grassroots political behavior. They have focused 
instead on the history of libertarian or neo-liberal ideas.”94 Martin also hints 
that it is easier to respect the anti-tax movements from a sociological 
perspective than from an intellectual perspective: “Like other practical 
traditions in American politics, the grassroots libertarian tradition is not 
always logically coherent, but it is sociologically coherent.”95 All this may be 
true, but it is also true that Rich People’s Movements only hints at the 
rhetorical richness of the books, pamphlets, and statements of the anti-tax 
movements. I cannot go a great deal deeper in this review, but I offer four 
examples—one from the late 1930s and three from the 1950s—in the hope 
that they will provide some sense of the extreme rhetorical styles 
characteristic of much of the twentieth-century history of rich people’s anti-
tax movements in the United States. 
The earliest of these examples is J. A. Arnold’s 1938 book, The 
Desire to Own.
96
 Written in support of the proposed 25 percent constitutional 
limitation, the 151-page book (featuring numerous black-and-white 
illustrations vaguely in the style of William Blake) offers a seriously-
intended but fanciful account of how lessons gleaned from the animal 
kingdom and the development of civilization lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that the Sixteenth Amendment “makes it possible for Congress to 
change our form of government from a democracy to an autocracy without 
the consent of the people.”97 Starting near the very beginning, Arnold opines 
that “[w]hen the first life cell crawled out of the water, looked around and 
decided to stay on land it was the first and most momentous decision of all 
time.”98 Sadly, the reader learns a few pages later that “[t]he greatest tragedy 
in the evolution of animal life was when the Whale turned back from land to 
water.”99 What, one might ask, does this have to do with the income tax? 
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Arnold explains: “The greatest calamity in the evolution of government was 
when this nation adopted the 16th Amendment . . .   .”100 
According to Arnold, “The Desire to Own was the most powerful 
thought that ever entered the mind of man.”101 The desire to own gave rise to 
the establishment of the right to own
102—the right fatally undermined by the 
Sixteenth Amendment. Much of the book is devoted to “a sightseeing 
journey through the jungles, down the cow paths and along the highways of 
nations, observing the origin, growth and decay of the ‘Desire to Own’ as it 
influences civilization.”103 On this journey, the reader is informed that “the 
Gorilla was the first land owner,”104 and is offered lessons based on 
contemplation of lions, dinosaurs, antelopes, and great auks, among other 
creatures.
105
 
Arnold explains that the all-important right to own is not compatible 
with the Sixteenth Amendment, which “opened up the gateway for 
misfortune and calamity to overtake us and we are now writhing in the agony 
of our own folly.”106 Things are much worse for humans (at least those 
residing in the United States) than for the animals: “The birds own their 
nests, the foxes their dens, but no human being can own his home, his 
business, or his earnings and savings. Title to the purse rests with the 
Government.”107 The only solution, of course, is the implementation of 
Arnold’s proposed repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment.   
I hope the preceding conveys some sense of the weirdness of The 
Desire to Own. To a modern reader, whose idea of the appropriate 
argumentative style for a general-readership book proposing fundamental tax 
reform has been formed by the likes of The Flat Tax
108
 and The FairTax 
Book,
109
 The Desire to Own appears to belong in some parallel universe. 
Martin accurately describes The Desire to Own as “a sweeping piece of 
agitational propaganda written in a popular style, with big type and dramatic 
illustrations,”110 and provides a fair summary of the book’s argument. To this 
reader, however, he does not fully convey just how stylistically bizarre the 
book really is, in its role as the centerpiece of a seriously-intended campaign 
for fundamental tax reform. 
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My three other examples all come from three men in the 1950s, 
working somewhat in the shadow of Corinne Griffith, Vivian Kellems, and 
the Liberty Belles. The first is Frank Chodorov, author of the previously-
noted 1954 book, The Income Tax: The Root of All Evil.
111
 In the outline of 
its case against the income tax, Root of All Evil closely resembles The Desire 
to Own. Both contend that there is a natural right to own property, and that 
the Sixteenth Amendment violates that right. However, the books could 
scarcely be more different in style. While Arnold amiably offers the reader a 
guided journey through Arnold’s idiosyncratic versions of natural and human 
history, Chodorov provides a classic example of what historian Richard 
Hofstadter famously described in a 1963 essay as the paranoid style in 
American politics.
112
  
In his essay, Hofstadter explains that the paranoid style reflects 
“uncommonly angry minds”; he adopts the pejorative label “because no 
other word adequately evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration, 
suspiciousness, and conspiratorial thinking that I have in mind.”113 The 
paranoid style’s “central preconception” is “the existence of a vast, insidious, 
preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to 
perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character.”114 Although Hofstadter offers 
examples of the paranoid style on both ends of the political spectrum, and 
from several centuries of European and American history, the essay’s focus 
is on the dominance of the paranoid style on the extreme right wing in mid-
twentieth century America. The members of the modern right wing, 
Hofstadter writes, feel that “America has been largely taken away from them 
and their kind, though they are determined to try to repossess it and to 
prevent the final destructive act of subversion.”115 To a practitioner of the 
paranoid style, the situation is always desperate: “The paranoid spokesman 
… traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, 
whole systems of human values. He is always manning the barricades of 
civilization. . . . Time is forever just running out.”116 
With the concept of the paranoid style in mind, consider some 
examples of Chodorov’s prose. After offering a list of the cultural woes of 
modern America, including the fact that “the abhorrence attached to the word 
‘socialism’ in this country before 1913 is wearing off,” Chodorov explains, 
“All these changes in our culture are directly traceable to the abandonment of 
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the doctrine of private property—that is, to the Sixteenth Amendment.”117 In 
Chodorov’s view, “The income tax is not only a tax; it is an instrument that 
has the potentiality of destroying a society of humans.”118 Taxation based on 
ability to pay inevitably descends into slavery: “When all the capital in the 
country is in the hands of the government, then all of us must work for the 
government under the conditions it prescribes—and that is slavery.”119 What 
was the source of this pernicious income tax? Chodorov explains that it came 
from foreign socialists:  
 
So, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
Americans took to the class-war doctrine recently imported 
by the socialists; here was a plausible cause of all of their 
misfortunes, a logical scapegoat for their dissatisfaction. . . . 
The socialists had also imported the idea of a graduated 
income tax. Their prophet [Karl Marx] had written that this 
is the ideal instrument for destroying the hated capitalistic 
system, and they were duty bound to promote it.
120
 
 
With italics Chodorov drives home his conclusions: 
 
Income taxation appeals to the governing class because in 
its everlasting urgency for power it needs money. 
Income taxation appeals to the mass of people 
because it gives expression to their envy: it salves their 
sense of hurt. . . .  
So that, the sum of all the arguments for income 
taxation comes to political ambition and the sin of 
covetousness.
121
 
If it is not already too late to save the country, it is nearly so. For Chodorov, 
the income tax is “the atomic bomb that has virtually destroyed the 
Union.”122 
The concerns expressed by Chodorov were central to mid-century 
American thought in the paranoid mode.
123
 Hofstadter notes the right-wing 
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scorpions, Chodorov remarks: 
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belief in a “sustained conspiracy . . . to undermine free capitalism, to bring 
the economy under the direction of the federal government, and to pave the 
way for socialism or communism.”124 To illustrate the point, Hofstadter turns 
to none other than Chodorov: “Details might be open to argument among 
right-wingers, but many would agree with Frank Chodorov . . . that [the] 
campaign began with the passage of the income tax amendment to the 
Constitution in 1913.”125 
In keeping with his generally low level of interest in rhetoric and in 
the history of ideas, Martin provides only a brief description of The Root of 
All Evil, which conveys virtually no sense of the book’s paranoid style 
(beyond what might be gleaned from the title itself).
126
 Neither in connection 
with Chodorov nor anywhere else does Martin mention Hofstadter’s analysis 
of the paranoid style. 
Martin recounts the strange story of T. Coleman Andrews, who 
shortly after stepping down as IRS Commissioner transformed himself into a 
crusader for the abolition of the income tax, and then became a third-party 
presidential candidate in the 1956 election.
127
 Andrews’ road-to-Damascus 
conversion made him a celebrity in the anti-tax movement. As Hofstadter 
notes, a “recurring aspect of the paranoid style is the special significance that 
attaches to the figure of the renegade from the enemy cause.”128 What is 
missing from Martin’s account is, not surprisingly, a sense of Andrews’ 
rhetorical style, which equals Chodorov’s in its paranoid intensity. In a very 
lengthy 1956 interview with U.S. News and World Report, Andrews urges 
the repeal of the income tax, although he declines the interviewer’s request to 
explain how the government might replace the lost revenue.
129
 Andrews 
warns that soon “[t]he Government will own everything, and we’ll be forced 
to do the bidding of commissars imbued with the idea that they know better 
how to spend our money than we, and vested with the authority to do it.
130
 
The income tax was “conceived in vengeance” against the rich, and will lead 
                                                                                                                   
Whatever chastisement with scorpions may be, it is 
certainly not pleasant to the recipient. And that is something you 
might remember when an agent of the Internal Revenue 
Department calls you on the carpet. . . . Things could be much 
worse than they are; we could be chastised with scorpions. 
Id. at 2.  
124. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 112, at 25. 
125. Id. 
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25, 1956) [hereinafter Andrews Interview]. 
130. Id. at 63. 
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“eventually to dictatorship.”131 Andrews expresses his unhappiness at seeing 
his country “dancing to the tune of slave makers.”132 “Maybe,” he muses, 
“we ought to see that every person who gets a tax return receives a copy of 
the Communist Manifesto with it so he can see what’s happening to him.”133 
And then there was J. Bracken Lee, who as governor of Utah wrote a 
foreword for Root of All Evil in 1954, and in 1955 announced that he was 
refusing to pay his income tax. Martin sets forth all the crucial biographical 
facts,
134
 and in this case even provides a taste of the rhetoric by quoting a 
speech in which Lee claimed that because of the income tax the federal 
government “to my mind amounts to a dictatorship.”135 This, however, only 
scratches the surface of Lee’s paranoid style. In 1958, two years after he lost 
his bid to be reelected as governor, Lee testified before the House Ways and 
Means Committee on the evils of the income tax.
136
 In his written testimony 
Lee reached greater rhetorical heights than even Chodorov and Andrews. A 
few of the more remarkable examples will suffice: 
 
Now the income tax is exalting political cannibalism so 
rapidly that it has become the No. 1 instrument serving the 
outside enemy with its objective of murder by suicide for the 
United States.
137
 But the freedoms which they won in 1789 
were lost to us in the revolution of 1913—a revolution 
which occurred right before the eyes of people who knew so 
little about freedom, despite supposedly superior education, 
that they joined hands unwittingly with the forces arranging 
the funeral of freedom.
138
  
 
The denial of private property implicit in the income tax 
expressed the essence of  
psychopathic socialism.
139
  
 
[T]he scale of living of the American people cannot be 
sustained indefinitely on anything that begins and ends with 
hate, as does the income tax. What could epitomize so 
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strikingly the ravages of the virus of socialism and the 
venom of communism?
140
 
 
Something might be learned about anti-tax movements by comparing 
the arguments and styles of Arnold, Chodorov, Andrews, and Lee, with those 
of more recent opponents of the income tax. A comparison with the book-
length presentations of the flat tax (by Hall and Rabushka) and the FairTax 
(by Boortz and Linder) is illuminating. Because Rich People’s Movements 
pays little attention to rhetoric and none at all to the flat tax and the FairTax, 
it does not undertake such a comparison. Without attempting a 
comprehensive comparison here, I offer a few thoughts as to what a more 
careful comparative study might conclude. 
Unless one counts the call for “another Declaration of Independence, 
this time from an unfair, costly, complicated federal income tax,”141 there are 
no traces of the paranoid style in the Hall-Rabushka exposition of the flat 
tax. Instead, Hall and Rabushka offer a sober presentation of the design of 
the flat tax, and low-in-rhetoric arguments for its superiority over the income 
tax in terms of simplicity, fairness, and economic efficiency. The approach 
of Boortz and Linder in their book on the FairTax is somewhere between the 
paranoid style of the anti-tax advocates of the 1950s and the almost-
technocratic style of Hall and Rabushka. On the one hand, the book begins 
with a long quotation in the paranoid style from T. Coleman Andrews 
himself, and features occasional observations along the lines of “[t]here is 
absolutely no limit to the government’s desire for your money,” and a 
reference to “the income tax . . . being molded into a more perfect weapon of 
class warfare.”142 On the other hand, the bulk of the book adopts a 
straightforward approach similar to—although less sophisticated than—that 
of Hall and Rabushka, and the rhetorical flourishes in the paranoid-style are 
far less frequent and far less extravagant than those of the 1950s. 
What explains the stylistic difference between the earlier anti-
income-tax advocates and their successors? Hofstadter emphasizes the 
absolutist orientation of practitioners of the paranoid style: 
 
Since what is at stake is always a conflict between absolute 
good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not a 
willingness to compromise but the will to fight things out to 
the finish. . . . This demand for unqualified victories leads to 
the formulation of hopelessly demanding and unrealistic 
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goals, and since these goals are not even remotely attainable, 
failure constantly heightens the paranoid’s frustration.143 
  
The 1950s anti-tax leaders—who urged repeal of the income tax without 
worrying themselves over how (if it all) it might be replaced
144—were 
paranoid (in the Hofstadter sense) not only in their rhetoric, but also in the 
substance of their policy proposal. The only complete victory would have 
been the repeal of the federal income tax without replacement. Uninterested 
in anything less than complete victory, the 1950s activists proposed exactly 
that—in blatant disregard of the fact that their goal was “not even remotely 
attainable.”145 The paranoid rhetoric matched the paranoid substance of the 
proposal.   
By contrast, a proposal to replace the income tax with some other 
less objectionable tax reflects a willingness to compromise, and an 
understanding that a qualified victory is preferable to the utter defeat that is 
the inevitable fate of a campaign to repeal the income tax without 
replacement. Thus the flat tax and the FairTax are not paranoid-type 
proposals in substance. It is not surprising, then, that the advocates of such 
non-paranoid proposals mostly eschew paranoid-style rhetoric in their 
presentations (albeit with occasional lapses in the case of Boortz and Linder).   
The tension between paranoid-style and non-paranoid-style rich 
people’s anti-tax movements is an important part of the century-long story of 
those movements. Had he paid more attention to rhetoric, and had he 
included the flat tax and the FairTax in the story, Martin might have been 
able to offer some important insights into why paranoid-style movements 
predominated in some decades and non-paranoid-style movements in others. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Rich People’s Movements has a few significant gaps in its analysis 
and in its coverage, and I have suggested in this review how some of those 
gaps might be filled. Despite those few gaps, Martin’s work deserves to be 
recognized as a landmark in the study of the politics of taxation in twentieth-
century America. The movements he illuminates have played an important 
role in shaping the federal income tax. Although few of the movements fully 
achieved their goals, often even the less-than-fully-successful movements 
                                                 
143. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 112, at 31. 
144. See, e.g., Andrews Interview, supra note 130, at 62. Andrews explains 
his refusal to discuss a replacement for the income tax: “they’d start up a great fuss 
over whether that particular plan made sense, and the idea of creating corrective 
machinery never would even get a hearing.” Id. 
145. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 112, at 31. 
2014]                    Tearing Out the Income Tax by the (Grass)Roots                      673 
 
greatly influenced legislative outcomes to the benefit of the rich.
146
 As 
Martin notes, today’s Tea Party is very much in the tradition of rich people’s 
movements,
147
 and it seems likely that the Tea Party or successors in the 
same tradition will continue to be influential throughout the present 
century.
148
  
Considering the practical importance of the movements (both 
looking backward and looking ahead), and the fascinating paradox of 
populism for the rich at the movements’ core, it is surprising that until 
Martin the movements had received little scholarly attention. The century-
long continuity of the movements had not been recognized, and some of the 
most interesting and important movements—including the rural bankers of 
the 1920s and the women of the 1950s—had not been merely understudied, 
but virtually forgotten. By recovering the histories of these almost-lost 
movements, Martin has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
modern tax politics in the United States. 
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